University of Washington School of Law

UW Law Digital Commons
Articles

Faculty Publications

1989

The Lesson of the Owl and the Crows: The Role of
Deception in the Evolution of the Environmental
Statutes
William H. Rodgers, Jr.
University of Washington School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
Recommended Citation
William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the Owl and the Crows: The Role of Deception in the Evolution of the Environmental Statutes, 4 J.
Land Use & Envtl. L. 377 (1989), https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/263

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.

THE LESSON OF THE OWL AND THE CROWS: THE
ROLE OF DECEPTION IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
WILLIAM

I.

H.

RODGERS, JR.*

GAME THEORY AND THE ADVANTAGES OF THE GOOD FAKE

In recent times, a number of writers have devoted attention to the
application of game theory to legal phenomena.' Unlike much formal
decision analysis, the game theory "best" choice is strikingly conditional and dependent upon the strategies of the other players. 2 The
point is made convincingly by the predicament of the red squirrel: 3 the
squirrel developed chattering as a strategy to discourage predators like
the great horned owl; it was a good strategy for the moment because
an alert prey is of no interest to the owl. But chattering is not a good
strategy for all times and occasions; with the appearance of a new
predator-humans armed with rifles-chattering is a decidedly poor
strategy.
In this world of strategies and counterstrategies, the advantages of
the good fake are not to be overlooked. Fakery is an indelible part of
the landscape in settings where we readily accept the gaming metaphor-sporting events are the obvious examples. But I wish to emphasize how fakery and deception can play an important role in legal
interactions as well, particularly in the writing of the environmental
statutes.
Environmental lawyers often are fond of borrowing examples from
natural history to illustrate propositions of law. There is more to this
* William H. Rodgers, Jr., Bloedel Professor of Law, University of Washington, Seattle,
Washington 98105, delivered as a lecture at Florida State University College of Law, Feb. 25,
1988. This essay benefited from a presentation at a workshop at the Yale Law School, Nov.
1986. A companion article will appear as Rodgers, The Lesson of the Red Squirrel: Consensus
and Betrayal in the Environmental Statutes, 5 J. CONTEMIP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
(1988)
(Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law).
1. See, e.g., Rodgers, The Evolution of Cooperation in Natural Resources Law: The
Drifter/Habitu&
Distinction, 38 U. FLA. L. REv. 195 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Drifter/Habitu];
W.H. RoDGERs, ENVIRONmENTAL LAW: Am AND WATER, 2 vols. (1986) [hereinafter Am AND
WATER]; Elliot, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of EnvironmentalLaw, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 313 (1985).
2. 1986 Drifter/Habitu§,supra note 1, at 197.
3. Rodgers, The Lesson of the Red Squirrel: Consensus and Betrayal in the Environmental
Statutes, 5 J. CONTEN'. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
(1988) [hereinafter 1988 Red Squirrel].
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practice than habit, it seems to me, because the natural laws of evolution contain lessons in the results of competitive struggle that fit
closely the experiences of legal gameplaying.
Nature, it turns out, offers a treasure trove of fakes, feints, and
deceptions, described in the literature usually under the heading of
mimicry. 4 Individual members of species succeed not only by hiding,
but by misrepresentation if they are discovered by predators. One can
find examples of sheep in wolves' clothing: delicious insects that look
like poisonous ones and flies that succeed in droning on the same frequency as stinging bees. Some wolves are dressed in sheeps' clothing:
one tropical hawk drifts about like a vulture and enjoys great hunting
success because the victims mistakenly believe they are in the presence
of a bird who prefers carrion. Nature offers this widespread resort to
deceptive props: some moths have evolved eyespot patterns on their
wings that are thought to startle predators, and thus offer the intended victims momentary opportunities for escape.
And nature gives examples of deliberately deceptive behavior: the
title of my lecture is drawn from a tale5 of an owl and some crows
who were reared in close proximity to one another. In order to discourage a steady and dangerous diet of silent swoops, any one of
which could be fatal, the crows developed a strategy of wandering
into easy range, "pretending" to be wholly unaware of the presence
of the owl, only to sidestep the futile strikes with disdain and ease. By
this stratagem, the crows "proved" to the satisfaction of the owl that
crows could not be seized, under even the best of circumstances, and
the unwanted attacks ceased altogether.
II.

FAKING AND DECEPTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES

In another paper, 6 I've developed the notion that the process of enactment of the environmental statutes is a gameplaying phenomenon
that is likely to yield legislation with both "consensus" and "betrayal" features. It is important to underscore the significance of deception, both in building the "consensus" necessary for enactment,
and in accomplishing the "betrayal" often observed in the waning
hours of enactment.

4. E.g., Lewin, Do Animals Read Minds, Tell Lies?, 238 ScIENcE 1350 (1987); Letter of
M.E. Bitterman, Creative Deception, 239 SCIENcE 1360 (1988) (noting that the capacity to communicate includes the ability to deceive); P. EVANS, OURSELVES AND OTHER ANn&ALs 105-124
(1987).
5. B. HEiNRICH, ONE MAN'S OwL 140-150 (1987).
6. 1988 Red Squirrel, supra note 3.
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A.
1.

Fakery: The Materialof Consensus

Process Entitlements, Hedges, and Bets

It is no secret that process can consume substance, 7 and the environmental laws offer many examples .8 Process is an excellent hiding place
for lawmakers who wish to remain uncommitted to particular substantive outcomes. Students of the subject often are astounded by the
profound indirection that grips the field of environmental law. Only
occasionally does the law ask whether a particular course of conduct
is compatible with environmental values. The question is more likely
to be posed in process terms-expressed most prominently in the impact statement requirements.
2.

Ambiguity and Delegation

Delegation of authority is another famous preference-hider that
makes a regular appearance in the environmental statutes. To mention
but one prominent example, the term "unreasonable risk" appears
thirty-five times in the thirty-three pages of the Toxic Substances Control Act. 9 There is great comfort for legislators who wish to hide in
this thicket immune from the sharp scrutiny of predatory constituents.
3.

Dissembling and Manipulation

Dissembling and manipulation are other devices found regularly in
environmental statutes that allow legislators to remain noncommittal.
"Dissembling should be taken to mean hoping to achieve A by voting
for B and manipulation should be taken to mean a packing of the
agenda to make dissembling possible." 10 The phenomenon is described convincingly by Judge Abner Mikva who gives this account of
the "careful[] nurturing" of a "difficult coalition" that included miners, mine owners and environmentalists by Representative Morris
("Mo") Udall as he guided some strip mining legislation through the
Congress:
He [Udall] was the floor manager and a lot of us were sitting in the
cloakroom when one of the Members from West Virginia, a mining
7. See Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device upon the Substantive Law, 58
F.R.D. 307 (1973). "Substantive law is shaped and articulated by procedural possibilities." Id.
at 307.
8. See, e.g., 2 Am AND WATER, supra note 1, § 4.33(A), at 476-82 (toxic pollution regulations).

9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
10.

1988 Red Squirrel, supra note 3, at

__.
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state, got up and said, 'Now will the gentleman from Arizona assure
me that this bill protects state sovereignty and makes clear that the
states continue to have an active and important role in how the strip
mines are to be regulated.' Udall said, 'The gentleman from West
Virginia is absolutely correct. The bill protects states' rights and state
sovereignty and makes sure that the states continue to play an
important role.' A little later on in the debate one of the
environmentalist Congressmen got up and said, 'Now will the
gentleman from Arizona assure me that this once and for all sets
federal standards and makes it clear that there is a federal law that
decides what kind of strip mining will be allowed?' And Udall said,
'The gentleman is absolutely correct. The law once and for all will
put the federal authorities in control.' He then came into the
cloakroom for a drink of water and we laughed and said, 'Mo, they
both can't be right.' He said, 'The gentleman is absolutely correct.'
The bill passed. Is it any wonder that the bill is not as clear and
precise and specific as some of us might have wanted?"
4.

Postponements

Postponements, or "more study" provisions, are another useful
prop for lawmakers who won't or can't decide. There are all kinds of
reasons for putting off a decision until tomorrow, both benign and
otherwise, so it is relatively easy for a lawmaker to justify a "more
study" vote on principled grounds.
5.

Self-Nulifications

Self-nullifications are legislative stand-offs "where command and
countermand are stuffed into the same sorry package.' ' 2 A good example is the whistleblower protection provisions that are found in
some of the environmental statutes. 3 These provisions offer workers
who give evidence of polluting behavior protection from employer retaliation, but the thirty-day statute of limitations14 withdraws a meaningful remedy in all but the unusual case. Nobody wins under this
kind of legislation, of course, but nobody loses either, and that is why

self-nullification in legislation is not at all uncommon.
6.

Teases or Aspirational Commands

Teases or aspirational commands are additional techniques that allow lawmakers to be simultaneously "for" and "against" identifiable

11.
12.
13.
14.

Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 627, 636-37 (1987).
.
1988 Red Squirrel, supra note 3, at _
See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1982).
Id. § 2622(b)(1).
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outcomes. Like the delegation tactic, commitment to a vague goal
does not tie a lawmaker to any particular means of implementation. 5
This is a dream political world without unsavory options and irascible
victims. The hard choices must await initiatives by somebody else.
B.

1.

Fakery: The Materialof Betrayal

Defections

Defection is a term I've used to describe various end-of-the-game
stratagems used to seize advantages at the expense of the unprepared
and ill-equipped. An example is the legislative decision that allowed
the Tellico Dam to go forward in the face of powerful environmental
and economic objections:
[Tihe pork-barrel proponents, in forty-two seconds, in an empty
House chamber, were able to slip a rider onto an appropriations bill,
repealing all protective laws as they applied to Tellico and ordering
the reservoir's completion. Despite a half-hearted veto threat by
President Carter and a last-minute constitutionally-based lawsuit
brought by the Cherokee Indians, the TVA [Tennessee Valley
Authority] was ultimately able to finish the dam, close the gates, and
flood the valley on November 28, 1979.16

2.

Sleepers

Sleepers, by definition, are legislative provisions with practical consequences far outstripping those anticipated by the formal legislative
vision. It goes without saying that gameplayers who create or detect
beneficial sleepers do not advertise the fact, since the strategy is to go
for sizeable gains without paying any price in return. Obviously, pursuit of the sleeper strategy means that a law will look a great deal
differently the day after enactment than it does the day before.

15. See Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30
UCLA L. REv. 740 (1983).
16. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter:An EnvironmentalLaw Paradigmand Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 805, 813-14 (1986) (footnotes omitted). See id. at 813-14 n.32
(pointing out how the legislative "maneuver" violated the rules of the House of Representatives
and how the move was engineered "so that none of the few representatives present would understand what was being done").
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III.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAKERY OVER

TIME: AN

EVOLUTIONARY

VIEW OF STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS

Instability of the Legislative Product

A.

Can we say anything useful about the fate of these environmental
statutes that include a precarious mix of consensus and betrayal
traits? First, let us define a statute as an act of the legislature that
instructs persons and organizations to act in certain ways. The typical
statute contains many instructions or norms within the legislative
package, and these are subject to differing interpretations. This universe of plausible interpretations is taken to represent the population
for purposes of analysis. Students of evolution emphasize that close
attention must be paid to the sources of change within the population
under study and to the selection mechanisms that yield differential
1
survival rates.

7

What are the mechanisms that can introduce change or variation
into the set of instructions set loose as a statute? Preliminarily, it is
intuitively plausible that future gameplayers will take a strongly instrumental view of statutory instructions. These instructions will be
treated as part of the background environment available for selfmaintenance against the mischief of the world. The statute suddenly
means what lawyers and others say it means, as it undergoes translation in the world at large. Put somewhat differently, statutory instructions immediately will be put to use as interpretations in legal
gameplaying in a host of different arenas.
After enactment, self-imposed constraints on the players are suddenly loosened. Players are free to urge interpretations heretofore undisclosed, or indeed unimagined. Sleepers, skewers," and defections
are now in the open claiming unsuspecting victims. This frenzy of in-

17. E.g., N. ELDRIDGE, TIME FRAMES: THE RETHINKING OF DARWINIAN EVOLUTION AND THE
THEORY OF PUNCTUATED EQUmIBRIA (1985); E. MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT:
DIVERSITY, EVOLUTION, AND INHERITANCE (1982). See also J.T. BONNER, THE EVOLUTION OF
CULTURE IN ANDA IS (1980); D.R. HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE EsSENCE OF MIND AND PATTERN 119 (1985) (conflicting interpretations of a statute from which
some selection must be made?); H. KAUFMAN, TIME, CHANCE, AND ORGANIZATIONS: NATURAL
SELECTION IN A PERILOUS ENVIRONMENT (1985); Chibnik, The Evolution of CulturalRules, 37 J.
ANTHROPOLOGICAL REs. 256 (1981); Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in
Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977); Diener, Quantum Adjustment, Macroevolution, and the Social Field: Some Comments on Evolution and Culture, 21 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 423 (1980).

18. Skewers shift liabilities to nonparticipants. One example in environmental laws would
be the shifting of liabilities to the taxpayer, such as indemnification for owners of banned pesticides. 1988 Red Squirrel, supra note 3, at __.
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terpretation in the wake of enactment produces a long list of surprising readings and tactics. These include betrayals of sidebar agreements
not recorded in the legislation, the invention of legislative history after-the-fact, and the attribution of meanings scorned by the negotiating principals. 9 Legislative insiders routinely are offended by the
extraordinary directions "their" legislation takes at the hands of outsiders, amateurs and skewees.
This strong centrifugal tendency toward different interpretations is
reinforced by catalysts and accelerators that are part of the initial consensus product. The opportunistic decision-avoidance techniques necessary to secure a nonzero sum law 20 feed these later changes; the

postponements, such as the study or commission provisions, yield an
empirical harvest that can be used to modify tentative legislative conclusions. Delegations are famous for returning to haunt those who
took the easy way out. Other process deferrals rebound in similar
fashion as experience proves ihem unworkable in fact. 21 Variances and
exemptions necessary for enactment look like ugly "gaps" from the
fuller vantage point offered by time. Teases and half-laws are built-in
invitations to complete the story. 22 The victims of eleventh-hour defections are spoiling to settle the score, and may have good reason to
23
believe they were done in by a bogus or unrepresentative law.
B.

Courts as Selection Mechanisms

In this blizzard of different meanings, it is hardly surprising that
some interpretations stick and some don't. The institutions that do the
selecting are no mystery, 24 and the criteria for selection are the subject
of unceasing argument. Our attention will be confined to the courts
that have the prerogative to select and anoint as authoritative only the
chosen interpretations.
Courts change statutes because they reject some interpretations as
implausible and unjustified. Judicial readings can work in tandem

19. An illustration appears in Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1975),
aff'd, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977).
20. 1 AIR D WATER, supra note 1, at vii.
21. The toxic pollutant provisions of the Clean Water Act are illustrative. Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). See also 2 Am AND
WATER, supra note 1, § 4.33, at 475-90; C.S. Smodrr,A SEARCH FOR STRUCTURE: SELECTED EsSAYS ON SCIENCE, ART, AND HISTORY 62, fig. 3.13 (1981) (refinement, partitioning, and elaboration of statutory instructions over time?).
22. The "protect and enhance" language in the statement of purposes of the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1982), has grown into a huge no-significant-deterioration program. 1
AIR AND WATER, supra note 1, §§ 3.21-.23, at 351-82.
23. See supra text accompanying note 16.
24. These, of course, are legislatures, courts, agencies and private organizations.
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with other influences to encourage legislative amendments. The environmental statutes are amended regularly, often with an expressed design to embrace25 or overrule 26 provocative judicial decisions. A few of
the ways in which courts can accelerate this process of legislative reconsideration include the following:
* construing vague and ambiguous terms that were used as refuges
27
for choice avoidance;
* disregarding contrived legislative history;28
* recognizing and enforcing "sleepers" that may change costs and
benefits as calculated by the legislature;2 9
* disregarding the cross-cancellation purposes hidden in statutory
"teases," which is another way of creating a constituency aggrieved
by the turn of events.3 0
It goes without saying that identification of the "correct" posture
of the courts in reviewing statutory hybrids, those that are partly consensus and partly betrayal, is no easy task." Game theory counsels
that undeviating strategies are doomed to failure. This was the problem of the red squirrel, and it was the problem that was overcome by
the crows. One possibility is that the "best" strategy for the courts is
neither deference, nor a lack thereof to the legislative product, but
rather a combination of the two that can resist exploitation by the
legislative branch.
IV.

EVOLUTION AND DIRECTION: RIsE, FALL, OR DRIFT?

History is littered with the reputations of scholars who have struggled to discover normative advice in evolutionary behavior.3 2 But the

25. See 1 AIR AND WATER, supra note 1,at v-ix.
26. See W.H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES AND ToxIc SUBSTANCES 514 n.38
(1988). The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987, explicitly disapprove several court decisions.

27.

A commendable practice that is disapproved in Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the

Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549 (1985).
28. Compare United States v. Ilco, Inc., No. CV85-H-823-S (N.D. Ala. July 14, 1987)

(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (disregarding affidavits of two members of Congress stating
what was on their minds at the time of enactment in 1980) with Mikva, supra note 11 (discussing
the tendencies of legislators to develop contrived legislative history).
29. 2 AnR AND WATER, supra note 1, § 4.11, at 162-80.

30. See supra note 22.
31. 1988 Red Squirrel, supra note 3,at

-

(pointing out how the normal assumptions of

statutory interpretation disavow the deceptions that are manifest inthe process and product).
32. E.g., J. HUXLEY, EVOLUTION IN ACTION (1953); P. KITCHER, VAULTING AmToN: SoCIOBIOLOGY AND THE QUEST FOR HuMAN NATURE

(1985); R.

NISBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF

PROGRESS (1980); G.G. SImPSoN, TE MEANING OF EVOLUTION (1967); R.J. RICHARDS, DARWIN
AND THE EMERGENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF MIND AND BEHAVIOR (1987).
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question is unceasingly seductive: do statutes improve over time,33 decline, or wander about pulled to-and-fro by the warring factions? This
question does not get much easier if an attempt is made to reformulate it in descriptive terms, such as: does the legal presence of statutes,
for example, their authoritativeness or influence, grow, decline, or remain static when measured over time?
A.

Problems of Definition and Sampling

It is no easy trick to characterize the viability or authority of any set
of legislative instructions. One can envisage any number of indicators
that might serve as a rough measure of resolving power or authoritativeness of a legislative directive.3 4 Measuring change over time of this
elusive "authoritativeness" is a more difficult challenge yet. Impossibility theorems are likely to stand in the way of attempts to evaluate a
set of statutory instructions and to say something useful about their
future prospects.35 Even so simple a matter as statutory extinction,
marked by a repeal, may be indecisive if the observer chooses to pay
36
attention to the genetic heritage of the new legislative species.
Even apart from the standard of statutory "authority," there is the
further complication of the short-run sample affording a misleading
indicator of trends.3 7 In all likelihood, empirical substantiation is
available for the more popular models: gradual decline,3 8 dormancy
and explosive growth, cyclical growth and decline, rapid growth and
gradual decline. This is not surprising since the phenomenon under
investigation, evolution of populations over time, is dramatically conditional: extravagant success and abject failure alike are subject to
sudden reversal when the environment changes. The red squirrel hy-

33. A poll of all of those who select one interpretation over another is likely to disclose
unanimity for the proposition that the selected reading makes the statute "better" (e.g., more
welfare enhancing). What is the collective outcome of these countless individual "bests"?
34. Indicators might include the number of pages, citations in lawyers' documents, recognition in the relevant culture, and probability estimates of compliance.
35. See L.B. SLOBODKIN, GROWTH AND REGULATION OF ANsMAL POPULATIONS (2d ed. 1980).
"There does not exist any measurement or set of measurements of a population itself which will
serve as a measure of its probability of survival." Id. at 206.
36. To mention but one example, The Insecticide Act of 1910, ch. 191, §§ 1-14, 36 Stat.
331, was repealed in 1947, but its historic statutory instructions linger on in today's Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodentcide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982). The search for common
ancestry is a delightful exercise long engaged in by paleoanthropologists, among others. It has
been aided by the spectacular advances in the techniques of molecular biology.
37.

See, e.g., V. BRAITENBERG, VEHICLES: EXPERIMENTS IN SYNTHETIC PSYCHOLOGY 19, fig.

8 (1984) (short-run behavior of a statute?).
38. See, e.g., E.R. TUFTE, THE VISUAL DISPLAY OF QUANTTATIVE INFORMATION 41 (1983)
(gradual decline of a statute over time?).
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pothesis advises that every successful strategy is uniquely dependent
39
upon what the other players are doing.
B.

The Prospects of Devolution

Finessing these several difficulties, do we nonetheless have reasons
for believing that the prominent fate of a statute is decline? After all,
information theory is intimately linked to the entropy laws, 4 0 and legal
researchers are constantly stumbling across the bones of desuetudenal
laws. Unfortunately, any general thesis of decline also must account
for spectacular episodes of growth. Historians of environmental law
could substantiate the claim that dramatic "advances" in the field
have been occasioned by the opportunistic application of old and out41
dated laws.
Three lines of argument hold promise for substantiating a thesis of
general decline. First is the intuitively appealing notion that any legislative "snapshot in time," however cleverly contrived, will be isolated
and gradually overwhelmed by changes of fact and value. Working
against this vision of statutory entropy are various rehabilitation mechanisms to keep the laws current or responsive. Judicial interpretation is an obvious possibility, 42 although one suspects there is a
penalty associated with the best judicial revisions of old statutes.4 3 Despite this sense of a "Second Law" 4 at work, for example, that statutes will run down faster than they can be fixed, one really can't be
sure. The legislation perceived as a "snapshot in time" also evolves
with the times. Thus, the outcome of any contest between the tenden-

39. 1988 Red Squirrel, supra note 3. Robert Axelrod shows us that tit-for-tat is a robust
and successful strategy in a wide variety of environments. R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION, passim (1984). See also P. ANTHONY, GOLEM IN Trm GEARs 254-279 (1986). Tit-fortat is a failing strategy, however, in a world of defectors.
40. See J. CAMPBELL, GRAmmATIcAL MAN: INFORMATION, ENTROPY, LANGUAGE, AND LIFE
(1982). It was, I believe, Alfred North Whitehead who said: "Information keeps no better than
fish."
41. Nominees include issues of water pollution (Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982)
and Bonneville Project Act of 1937, 16 U.S.C. § 832 (1982), that forbids power deliveries to
polluters), clearcutting, DDT, and the Alaska pipeline. User, as distinguished from preserver,
gains under outdated laws include the General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-39 (1982),
and Massachusetts beach access (see Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 313 N.E.2d 561
(1974) (discussing Mass. HB 481 (1974)). These unforeseen applications of statutory "sleepers"
typically inspire "corrective" legislative responses.
42. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTEs (1982); see generally G.
GILMORE, TiE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).

43. The penalty, perhaps, is measured by a decline in our unidentified standard of statutory
influence; call it a cost of political illegitimacy.
44. Reference is to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. See J. RIFKIN wITH T. HOWARD,
ENTROPY: A NEW WORLD VIEW 33-37, 56-58 (1980).
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cies of decline and the vehicles of rehabilitation appears indeterminate.
A second way to think about statutes declining over time is to focus
upon the psychology of the players. Statutory paradigms in the minds
of lawyers may share a fate similar to scientific paradigms in the
minds of scientists.4 5 Old visions are squeezed out by the new, not
because of mass conversion, but because the old believers otherwise
die and pass from the scene. 6 Of course, this metaphor is imperfect:
new scientific theories catch on and spread presumably because they
represent an improvement in explanatory power and utility for the investigator. Are new laws an improvement on the old in this practiceenhancing sense? 47 One can think of a half-dozen reasons why "new
law" arguments are preferable to the "old, ' 48 but strong trends do
not necessarily exclude opportunities for the maverick. Game theory
brings us back to the lesson of the red squirrel and of the owl and the
crows: every strategy is a winner if the others are pursuing strategies
4
that make it a winner.

9

A third way to assess the fate of statutes over time can draw upon
the insights of evolutionary biology about the dangers of specialization. Exquisite refinement within clumsy historical constraint is an evolutionary path oft-taken,50 and it is a road to extinction: "[s]uch is
the way of nature that solutions so perfect they left no room for further improvement often [come] to a premature end." 5 This course of
specialization is followed by many of the environmental statutes because of the dynamics of the gameplaying that produces the legislation
and changes to it.2 One can expect these jerrybuilt specialist laws to
be trapped in a destiny of decline, flanked and overwhelmed by cir-

45. See T. KussN, Ti STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
46. An informal tally of subscribers to the old Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982),
as a tool of water pollution control discloses a diminishing pool of supporters, made up mostly
of aged sentimentalists and a small group of the legally illiterate, that is, nonlawyer investigators
who naively believe that the law means what it says.
47. Old laws, after all, have stood the test of time.
48. For example, they have a greater claim to legitimacy, a closer fit to contemporary problems and are more efficient.
49. The discussion in the text is suggestive of a famous article by John Maynard Smith, The
Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts, 47 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 209
(1974). One suspects that the choice of research models is better explained by game theoretic
thinking than by maximization analysis, where researchers gradually converge on the "best"
approach. In law, it seems, growth of popularity of one school simply opens the door to the
successful invasion by "maverick" hypotheses.
50. This lesson is taught elegantly in the several books of Stephen Jay Gould. See, e.g., S.
GOULD, THE FLAiGo's SMILE: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY (1985).
51. See L. MARGULIS & D. SAGAN, MICROCOSMOS: FOUR BILLION YEARS OF EVOLUTION FROM
OUR MICROBIAL ANCESTORS 147 (1986).
52. See 1Am AND WATER, supra note 1, at v-ix.
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cumstances changing about them. The decline of individual enactments, of course, does not speak to the success or failure of the
overall enterprise. The legal war against pollution proceeds on many
fronts, and can claim gains elsewhere that outweigh individual setbacks.
V.

CONCLUSION

Deception is an integral component of communication and a prominent feature of the decisionmaking processes that yield the formal
products of legislation. The effect of this deception on future legislative behavior and its treatment in the courts are deserving subjects of
inquiry. The principal judicial response to this phenomenon has been
denial, but there are reasons to believe that consistent perpetuation of
this fiction assures neither admirable legislation nor a quick fix of past
errors.

